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Abstract: Telecommunication networks consist of communication units interconnected physically or by means of
protocols in order to provide basic services like data, voice, or image transfers. In this study, a modeling frame for
network units and their links in a topological frame is presented based on a real mobile communication network named
TASMUS (TAktik Saha MUharebe Sistemi - Tactical Field Combat System). Alarm handling is one of the most critical
features required in communication networks. Based on simulated single alarm and multiple (double) alarm scenarios,
known powerful alarm estimation approaches, namely the coding method, neural networks, and knowledge-based systems,
have been studied to assess their capabilities for identifying multiple faults that might occur simultaneously in real time.
They have also been compared in order to evaluate the performance of alarms under diﬀerent noise levels for specific
TASMUS networks.
Key words: Telecommunications network, network management, neural networks, alarm correlation, fault identification,
coding method, minimal distance decoder

1. Introduction
The basic management activations in telecommunications network units deal with configuration, performance
tests, alarm handlings, security, and accounting managements [1,2]. Alarm management in general includes
monitoring eﬀorts of network alarms and taking diagnostic measures after identifying the faults causing alarms
in the network. As the size of the telecommunications network increases, simultan[eous problems that may cause
multiple alarms will also be inevitable. Thus, alarm monitoring and alarm handling are accepted as a serious
matter. Alarm data should be processed carefully and the root cause/causes over the recorded alarms must
be isolated and estimated with a high accuracy rate in order to take proper and corrective measures in time.
The process to achieve this purpose begins with the alarm correlation along the alarm strings of the network.
Possible causes are matched to those alarms to provide a fault-correlated alarm database with certain causes.
Thus, one of the main applications for the network management system is employing the alarm manager and
agents that define other useful manageable applications embedded on network elements in order to access unit
resources [3]. Basically, agents send alarms to the manager whenever any abnormality occurs in its functional
routines and routes.
There are various studies generally defining alarm management in a knowledge-based structure, and more
rarely in statistical and neural basis (causal model, model-based reasoning, case-based reasoning, rule-based,
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coding) [3–15]. The coding approach is the most popular, well-known, and relatively simple to implement as a
main analysis tool in many studies [4,5]. In order to identify the fault alarms in correlations, their causes have to
be clustered through recorded alarm data in time windows or using SOM topology [3]. In the coding approach,
alarms are converted to vector codes and correlated with all elements of a matrix containing all observed/
recorded faults. These matching and correlation factors are generally evaluated by a minimum distance decoder
(MDD). There is a study employing a neural network as an alternative tool to be used instead of MDD in the
coding method [3,9]. It was reported that even in noisy environments, a neural network gives better results
than the MDD for identifying single source-based faults [6].
In general, most of the studies published and shared in this area assume a single fault and associated time
correlation. There is a lack of detailed analysis on neural models and their comparative performance reports,
and a few analyses that consider the predictive potential of neural networks with multiple faults available [[8,9].
In this study, we begin with the modeling frame of a real telecommunication network and its components in
order to obtain realistic simulation scenarios for alarm-providing signals [7]. Taking this network modeling
frame as a basis for our case study, the coding method and MDD algorithms together have been examined for
single and double alarms in various alarm scenarios. In the next stage, this standard method employing the
coding approach was replaced by a neural network structure and a knowledge-based system while analyzing
various design parameters for searching for the best possible outcome in a predictive purpose.
The first section of the article introduces the basic alarm concepts and the frame in which the research
development is discussed. The problem development section reviews essentials for understanding the basic
models in theory and simulations in terms of system topologies and their possible alarm scenarios. In this part,
the article also presents fundamentals of building blocks of modeling tools and preparing the alarm data sets
as close as possible to the real cases in the context of TASMUS configuration. The third section underlines
the theory of well-known classification and correlation techniques under the problem development requirements
and organizes these methods, namely MDD, multilayer perceptrons of an artificial neural network (ANN), and
a knowledge-based system (KBS), separately for the case studies defined on the simulation models. The last
section discusses all the results and performances for single and double faults generated by simulated models.

2. Problem development and modeling
2.1. Topology symbols
A telecommunication network is generally modeled by a set of radio link equipment and asynchronous transfer
mode (ATM) switches. Each network element also has manageable agent software. As in the traditional way,
the network elements are represented by nodes with their access points. The equipment for ATM switching,
band III, and band IV radio links are abbreviated as S1, B1, and M1 as shown in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c,
respectively. Some typical connection types between units are shown in Figures 2a–2d. Band III radio links in
general can be used to serve with a single connection while band IV can provide two radio links at the same
time.
(a)
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Figure 1. Network units: a) ATM switching, b) radio link band III, c) radio link band IV.
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(a)

(c)

(b)

(d)

Figure 2. Some basic connection types: a) band III-band III, b) band I-band IV, c) switch-band III, d) switch-band
IV.

In this study, a TASMUS network managed by ASELSAN (Turkey) as one of the projects was used to
simulate a real network case. The TASMUS network, which combines ATM and ISDN technologies internally, is
a communication network that provides secure, high-quality voice, video, and data communication to stationary
and mobile users [7]. The system consists of three layers of WAN, LAN, and mobile area network (WLAN) and
their associated links. In its mobile system structure, there are time division multiple access (TDMA)-based
wireless radio receivers and mobile radio link providers basically for military uses. All those receivers use a data
service provided by the ISDN central base to reach all network nodes. This briefly defined system may be a very
complicated network with many links covering a military area. However, the modeling units in a topological
frame will give us an accurate replication for other real configurations.
The following models shown in Figures 3a and 3b have been generated especially for simulating and
understanding some of the real conditions in a similar TASMUS network. S1, S2, and S3 are ATM switching
equipment and B1, B2, B3, B4, M1, and M2 are radio link devices physically connected to ATM switches. The
numbered black circles show the access points of the equipment. Network elements are connected via links and
can make connections as BB1, BB2, MM1, and SS1 indicating the connections between units. For example, BB2
refers the second band II to band II connection. Any equipment failure or link breakdown in the network can
cause many possible faults in a chain response (some of them may be unpredictable according to the complexity
of the scenario). For such cases the equipment sends alarms to an alarm manager warning that a fault has
been observed at that instant. In this study, only link-related alarms are considered in order to make a simple
analysis of the performance of the modeling methods outlined above.
Including device-related alarms requires more definitions on the alarm sets and is not necessary to explain
the performance analysis of the alarm handling models in comparative ways in our model developing stage. From
the topology given in Figure 3a, when a link is broken down or a network element is out of the service, multiple
alarms even for a single cause may be generated from the network. For instance, when the MM1 link is broken
down, M1, M2, S2-2 (2 refers to the terminal number), S2-3, S3-2, and S3-3 send alarms within a defined
short time. Those alarms can also be correlated by using their time window relationships. However, the alarm
operator cannot directly resolve the alarms and diﬃculties to find the root causes still remaining to be solved,
e.g., the problem on the MM1 link for this case. As a result the error management system should sort out the
problem by identifying the fault (MM1) from the alarm set and the correlated relations. This study extends the
multiple alarms problem introducing the second root of causes as well. From the same model, it is also possible
to consider another case when two links, BB1 and BB2, are broken down at the same time. In this case, S1-1,
679

YILMAZ/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

3
1

S1

2

SB1

SB2

4
SS1

1

B1

B2

1

2

2

BB1

B3

1

SS2
BB2

2

B4

1

SB1
1

2

SB2
1
SS3

4

S2

2

2

S3

4

SS4
3

3
SM1

SM2

SM1

1

M1

MM1

3

SM2

1
3

M2

2

2

(a)

3
1

S1

SB1
4
SS1

1

B1

2
SB2

B2

1

2

2

BB1

B3

1

SS2
BB2

2

B4

1

SB1
1
1

B5

2

2

SB2
1
SS3

SB3

4

S2

SB4

2

2

S3

4

1

B7

2

SS4
3

3
SM1

SM2

SM1

1

M1

3

MM1

2
BB3

SM2

1
3

M2
2
SS5

SS4

BB4

1

1
SB3
1

B6

2

4

S4

4

2

S5

SS6

2
SB4

1

B8

2

3

3

SB5

SB5
1

B9

1

2

B10

2

BB5

(b)

Figure 3. Network topologies used in simulations: a) first case, b) second case.

S2-1, B1, B3, S1-2, S3-1, B2, and B4 related alarms will be observed. Note that, for this case, time correlation
on received alarms may not correctly cluster the alarms since correlated alarms contain multiple faults.

2.2. Correlation matrix
For identifying the cases in the correct tracks of alarms, a correlation matrix, introduced as a simple solution
by including all the faults and alarms in the network, is tabulated in Figure 4. This is the corresponding matrix
for the previously defined topology given in Figure 3a as an example. All of the network elements and links are
defined together with all of the link-related alarms that can possibly be received. In the correlation matrix the
row headings show the access points or network elements that send the alarms and column headings show the
probable problems. The top of each column vector in the matrix defines a single symptom with the associated
(alarm) vector. The correlation matrix for the second case given in Figure 3b is inevitably more complicated
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due to its size and connections. However, in the simulations both cases will be considered to test our chosen
methods for comparison. The creation of the correlation matrix is straightforward and easy to build in practice.
If the network topology is available and modeled then all scenarios can be conveyed into the table. In terms
of computer simulation, the associated correlation matrix can easily be generated by using a suitable compiler.
One should note that the relevant codebook defined by the method is the same as the correlation matrix since
there is no redundant alarm information.

Figure 4. Correlation matrix for case 1.

3. Theory for the tools used for fault detection
This study uses the same topology with diﬀerent alarm scenarios for generating experimental data sets for
implemented modeling approaches for the detection task. Thus, there will be brief explanations in the following
sections about how these modeling tools utilize the data set in the problem development stage.
3.1. Coding approach
The coding approach uses the terms “problem”, “symptom”, and “correlation” instead of “fault”, “alarm”,
and “identification”, respectively. The set of symptom events caused by a problem is treated as a “code” that
underlines the problem. This approach uses the MDD to match alarm patterns in the run-time. Correlation is
simply the process of decoding the set of observed symptoms by determining which problem has the observed
symptoms as its code. The coding approach consists of two phases [4,10]. The first phase is the codebook
selection phase. In this phase, all of the problems and symptoms are organized using their cause and eﬀect
relationships. A causality graph is obtained with these relationships. Using the causality graph, a correlation
matrix including all sets of symptoms and problems is formed. Finally, the correlation matrix is reduced to a
codebook. The codebook is an optimal subset of events that must be monitored to distinguish the problems of
interest from one another while ensuring the desired level of noise tolerance. The preprocessing algorithm can
be used to build the optimal codebook [11].
The following phase is the decoding phase, in which the events in the codebook are monitored and
analyzed in real-time by finding problems whose codes optimally match an observed symptom vector. For
binary vectors with the same number of elements, the number of locations in which their respective elements
diﬀer is called the Hamming distance between these vectors [16]. The MDD calculates the Hamming distance
between the observed symptom vector and the code. The cause represented by the codebook vector with the
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smallest Hamming distance is proposed to be the problem. Missing and additional alarms are rated as noise.
Minimal distance decoding can resolve problems in the case of noise depending on the codebook selection. In
the experimental study, a data set is prepared by concatenating 1000 vectors picked up randomly from the
matrix. In the first topology there are 16 diﬀerent alarm vectors while in the second topology there 30 diﬀerent
vectors replicated in a 1000-samples-long data matrix for each case as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Concatenated alarm vectors.

For the first topology the data matrix is 14 × 1000 in dimension, whereas the second one is 26 × 1000.
It is also possible that alarm vectors can carry their own structural errors in real time due to misreading,
transmission, and alarm correlation problems. In order to minimize the eﬀect of this actual problem, all
possibilities are covered by introducing diﬀerent level of noises, i.e. replacing digits with their complementary
ones. For example, in the first data set, if 10% noise is required to be added to the data set, 10% noise will
mean replacing 1400 digits with its complementary digits out of the total 14,000 elements in the matrix. For
these two topologies the performances of the MDD are presented as correct identification of single faults versus
the percentage of noise introduced in Figure 6a. If the time window is not selected properly or two alarms
occur at the same time, naturally alarm vectors will obtain indications defined by two alarms. This situation
introduces a more diﬃcult case to be handled by the alarm management unit. In Figure 6b, this case with a
similar process is presented for two possible causes that can be detected in two diﬀerent topologies with the same
noise-adding schedule. In order to prepare the data set including two faults in one vector, the combinations of
two vectors are used in a random manner. The samples that have the same elements are not included in the set
and the alarm vectors through the combination process are concatenated to get 1000 samples as before. The
best results indicating two faults are accepted as the sources of the alarms by using the MDD method utilizing
the Hamming distance on the noisy data. As we can conclude from the figures, the MDD method works fine
when there is no noise introduced. However, as expected, the performance drops gradually as the noise level is
increased. The performance of the MDD for the double faults becomes poor considering that only 480 alarm
vectors are recognized correctly with no noise presence since there is a diﬃculty to distinguish diﬀerent alarms
from generated similar alarm vectors. The next part will assess the performance of a neural network approach,
specifically a multilayer perceptron structure.
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Figure 6. The eﬀect of noise on MDD for a) single fault, b) double faults.

3.2. Neural network as a nonlinear modeling tool
Multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) are proven to be universal approximators for a nonlinear input output mapping.
It has long been a problem in nonlinear modeling to find an eﬃcient set of nonlinear functions to approximate
the nonlinearity of problems for which the system architecture is not necessarily known [16,17]. Modeling a
process can simply be defined as follows:
YP = Φ(Xp ) + υ,
(1)
where Xp ={ x1 , x2 , . . . xn } stands for input parameters for the process, while Yp ={y 1 , y2 , . . . yn } refers to the
outputs of the process and υ is an additive noise (it is assumed that the process to be modeled obeys Eq. (1)
given above). Under these assumptions, an associated neural network (NN) model can be given by:
Yn = φ(XP ).

(2)

Yn ={ yn1 , yn2 , ....ynm , ...ynM } is the output of the NN model and m is the number of the outputs defined
by m = {1, . . . , M }. Φ(.) in Eq. (1), and φ(.) in Eq. (2) are nonlinear functions that describe input-output
relations for the process and NN-based model, respectively. This MLP structure with hidden layers together
with a popular learning algorithm known as the error backpropagation algorithm shows an ability to learn from
experience through adjusting weight parameters in the training phase. After suﬃcient training, the model is
said to generalize the physical model well on the test data, which had never been used before in the testing
stage of the NN model. For a valid generalization, it is important to avoid a phenomenon known as overfitting
(overtraining), as well as undertraining, which stands for using fewer epochs than required for the optimal
result of the generalization problem [16]. In both cases, the network loses the ability to generalize between
similar input-output pairs. The performance of this structure is also strongly related to the training time along
with the training set, which consists of carefully chosen pairs of inputs and their corresponding outputs. The
practical network used in our study is a feedforward neural network with 100 hidden neurons in order to cover
the complicacy that the problems demand. For the backpropagation algorithm, the learning rates are fixed to
η = 0.5 and the momentum term is chosen as α = 0.6. The input and output neurons are selected based on
the problem as usual. The output neurons, for instance, are limited by the number of causes that might occur
in the network. Hidden and output neurons use “sigmoid” functions as a nonlinear unit. It is well known that
there are many parameters that aﬀect the performance of the neural network in the learning and the testing
stages. Many important parameters were analyzed in detail and reported with a suﬃciently comparative manner
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[18]. This study refines many possibilities from parameter selection to model selection along with determining
a proper learning algorithm selection. Based on the best topology and the parameter selections the following
success rate for the fault recognition task is recorded and presented in Figure 7. The same vector sets for two
cases have been used again for the neural networks solution. As a standard phase, the set has been divided into
two sets to be used in training and testing stages. In the testing stage we have used all available data (1000
vectors) to cover all possible alarm scenarios.

Figure 7. Neural network results under noise: a) for a single fault, b) double faults ( α = 0.6, η = 0.5, neurons in single
hidden layer = 100, epochs = 500).

More detailed analysis has been carried out in order to propose the best parameter set for the optimal
neural network considering the eﬀects like number of epochs, momentum terms, learning rates, number of
neurons, and hidden layers [18]. As presented for the MDD, the results obtained from the best neural structure
are given in Figures 7a and 7b for single and double faults, respectively. Due to the inherent nonlinearity of
the neural model, the performance is much better if it is compared with the results of the MDD, especially for
scenarios including double faults. In both approaches, the second case has proven itself as a more challenging
topology to identify the alarms. Under 10% noise addition, single and double fault recognitions will be in
the bands of 800–700 and 600–500 correct identification rate, respectively. These figures show that the neural
network proposed performs well even if noise is extremely eﬀective through communication channels. If there
is not any noise challenge, the figures show that the NN model picks up all alarms and interprets correctly
in the given time window. When the noise (number of bits complemented) is increased, the performance of
identification drops gradually. The last method to be compared is a rule-based model, which shows another
paradigm toward a similar task.

3.3. Simulations by rule-based model
In previous parts of the analysis, practical diﬃculties were observed in generation of the correlation matrix based
on cause-and-eﬀect graphs. This part will use the first phase of experience obtained by both the MDD and NN
models and redefine the same problem in the frame of knowledge bases in order to develop a better working
mechanism. Facts and rules that can be used in constructing correlation matrices in PROLOG realization will
684
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be reviewed for the implementation of the rule-based solution when the alarms from the network are used as
inputs to a similar problem.
3.3.1. Generating the correlation matrix
Due to its inherent solution structure with rules and facts, the knowledge-based approach should allow the
construction of the correlation matrix easily when the facts are accepted as network devices (elements) and rules
refer to the obvious relations between them. In PROLOG, an ATM switch can be described as “central node
(s1 1, s1)”, implying that it is the first node of unit s1. In a similar manner, devices like band III are defined as
rlA(b1), rlA(b2), rlA(b3), rlA(b4), whereas “rlA(b1)” signifies that band III, named as the b1 device, is in the
network. Band IV devices in the network are presented in the form of rlB(m1), rlB(m2) in the same manner. For
example, two band III devices can make a radio-link connection and this link is formulized as “linkA(bb1, b1,
b3)”. In this representation, it is understood that two devices, namely b1 and b3, have a radio-link connection
through bb1. Similarly, the expression “bagC(mm1, m1, m2)” means that there is a radio-link connection
called mm1 between m1 band IV e and m2 band IV devices [18]. For formulation of realistic scenarios, Table 1
includes some of the facts and associated PROLOG expressions. Rule-based systems use some stated rules to
deduce possibilities of solutions by evaluating the listed facts for predefined topologies. Therefore, there should
be rules as well in order to underline the dynamic structure that may likely produce a chain up to possible fault
sources. These observed rules are summarized in Table 2.
Table 1. Facts and codes of PROLOG defined by topologies.

Fact number
1

2
3
4
5
6

7

Explanation
There are some ATM switch
nodes connected to some
other ATM switch nodes
There are some band III
units in the network
There are some band IV
units in the network
Some band IIIs are
connected to each other
Some band IVs are
connected to each other
Some band IIIs are
connected to the ATM
switch in the network
Some band IVs are
connected to the ATM
switch in the network

PROLOG codes for the example topology
santral uc(s1 1,s1), santral uc(s1 2,s1)
santral uc(s2 1,s2), santral uc(s2 2,s2)
santral uc(s2 3,s2), santral uc(s3 1,s3)
santral uc(s3 2,s3), santral uc(s3 3,s3)
rIA(b1), rIA(b2)
rIA(b3), rIA(b4)
rIB(m1)
rIB(m2)
bagA(bb1,b1,b3)
bagA(bb2,b2,b4)
bagC(mm1,m1,m2)
bagB(sb1,s1 1,b1), bagB(sb1,s2 1,b3)
bagB(sb2,s1 2,b2), bagB(sb2,s3 1,b4)
bagD(sm1,s2 2,m1), bagD(sm1,s3 2,m2)
bagD(sm2,s2 3,m1), bagD(sm2,s3 3,m2)

It is possible to obtain a correlation matrix by using these rules and facts. If the program is activated
based on all required possible alarms of the first scenario, the following table is generated as an output as given
in Figure 8.
The first element gives the fault; the other shows all possible alarms that should be observed for this
fault as assigned by 1. This is of course a perfect basis to construct the correlation matrix for the data set to be
used for any method named in this study. If the alarm vector includes more than one fault than the PROLOG
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then codes generate more than one fault source as a list. For this reason, two diﬀerent analyses are presented
in Figure 9 as a forced single answer or the answer available among possibilities in the list for each single and
double fault cases. Figures 9a and 9b also summarize the success rate for diﬀerent levels of noise eﬀects on
results. The rule-based system is forced to produce a single answer for a presented single fault, whereas it
produces two likely sources of double faults for searching the exact results capability. Listed results, on the
other hand, mark the exact fault sources from all possible answers in the list considering to evaluate whether
correct answers are in the list or not.
Table 2. Rules for faults and alarm generations.

Rule number
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7

Explanation
If a fault occurs in the band III unit, then all other connected band IIIs and connected ATM
nodes send alarms
If a fault occurs in the band IV unit, then all other connected band IVs and connected ATM
nodes send alarms
If a fault occurs in the ATM device, then connected all ATM nodes send alarms
If a disconnection occurs between band III units, then all connected band III units and
connected ATM nodes send alarms
If a disconnection occurs between a band III unit and ATM node, then all connected ATM
nodes send alarms
If a disconnection occurs between band IV units, then all connected band IV units and
connected ATM nodes send alarms
If a disconnection occurs between a band IV unit and ATM node, then all connected ATM
nodes send alarms

Figure 8. PROLOG fault possibilities for the first scenario.

4. Discussion and conclusion
This study has concentrated on presenting three methods in a comparative manner in order to assess dynamic
alarm handling capabilities. In simulation results, it is seen that the ANN provides better performance in
comparison with the other implemented methods. It is also observed that performances of both the MDD and
ANN are strongly aﬀected by the complexity of the topology or dynamic variations introduced by considering
new connections. The basic reason for this common disadvantage is that the correlation matrix required by
both methods has to be reorganized for any change in the topology as the ANN also demands a new learning
phase with a newly defined correlation matrix. On the other hand, for the KBS type fault prediction scheme,
introducing only a new device and associated connection knowledge will be suﬃcient enough to provide the
expected performance with minimum disturbance of the whole process. This experience obtained by this study
will provide a unified frame to analyze the network in terms of fault sources and adaptive network modifications,
as will be reported in future work.
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Figure 9. Correct answers from exact and listed results for: a) single, b) double faults.
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